
Full analysis
Dr Nicola Harding, Financial Crime Lab
On 2 October 2026, Ofcom's consultation on its draft Fraudulent Advertising Codes of Practice closed. The codes set out nearly 40 measures that the largest social media and search services would be expected to adopt to tackle paid-for scam adverts under the Online Safety Act 2023. They include banning advertisers who post scam adverts and stopping them returning, checking that new advertising accounts belong to who they claim to represent, verifying that anyone advertising banking or investment services is legally permitted to do so, testing AI advert-making tools for misuse, and creating a dedicated channel for trusted bodies such as law enforcement to flag scam adverts. Ofcom estimates that victims in the UK lose more than £200 million a year on average to these kinds of scams, and its research found that 51 per cent of online adults have encountered a potentially fraudulent advert (Ofcom, 2026a).
APP reimbursement places responsibility for fraud at the payment, the last link in a scam that most often begins online. This article turns to where that scam begins. My argument is that routine activity theory, and in particular the idea of the place manager, offers a precise way to understand both what Ofcom is attempting and where its approach may fall short.
Places, managers and the crime triangle
Cohen and Felson's (1979) routine activity approach explained crime as the convergence in space and time of a likely offender and a suitable target in the absence of a capable guardian (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Eck later extended this into what became known as the crime triangle, adding controllers for each element: handlers for offenders, guardians for targets, and managers for places. Place managers are the owners of places and the people they delegate to run them. Place management theory explains why a small number of places experience a great deal of crime while most experience little or none. The short answer is that poor management in the face of a crime threat creates chronic crime places (Eck and Madensen, 2018).
Madensen's work specified what place managers actually do, through four functions known by the acronym ORCA: organising space, regulating conduct, controlling access and acquiring resources (Eck and Madensen, 2018). The theory was developed for physical places such as bars, apartment blocks and car parks, but it does not depend on physical space. Madensen (2016) argues that once the concept of place is expanded to include networks, these theories can be applied even where there is no clearly defined physical location, because networks provide the settings in which offenders and targets meet (Madensen, 2016).
A social media or search platform is, in these terms, an unusually clear example of a proprietary place. The platform designs the space through its interface and recommender systems. It writes and enforces the rules of conduct. It decides who may open an advertising account. And it acquires resources from the activity that takes place there. Each of Ofcom's proposed measures maps onto one of these functions. Advertiser verification and banning repeat offenders are forms of access control. Moderation and trusted flagger channels regulate conduct. Testing AI advertising tools concerns how the space is organised.
Why place managers fail
The fourth ORCA function, acquiring resources, is where the difficulty lies. In a conventional crime place, a negligent landlord or bar owner may tolerate crime because preventing it costs money. In paid-for advertising, the conflict is sharper, because the offender is also a paying customer.
Reuters' investigation of internal Meta documents illustrates the problem. Meta internally projected in late 2024 that around 10 per cent of its annual revenue, about $16 billion, would come from advertising for scams and banned goods, and estimated that its platforms showed users 15 billion "higher risk" scam adverts every day. Meta told Reuters that the 10 per cent estimate was "rough and overly-inclusive" and that the true figure was lower (Reuters, 2025a). A later Reuters report found that Meta's own tests showed advertiser verification reduced scam adverts by as much as 29 per cent in the countries where it was required, yet the company had decided not to spend the roughly $2 billion it estimated universal verification would cost (Reuters, 2025b).
These are allegations based on documents, and the company disputes aspects of them. But the criminological point does not depend on any single figure. Place management theory predicts that where the costs of prevention fall on the manager and the benefits of crime partly accrue to the manager, management will be weak. The question is not whether platforms are capable of acting as effective place managers, since verification evidence suggests they are, but what would make them choose to do so.
Ofcom as super controller
Sampson, Eck and Dunham (2010) addressed exactly this question. Routine activity theory explains crime by the absence or ineffectiveness of controllers, but it did not explain why controllers are absent or ineffective. Their answer was the super controller: the people and institutions that regulate controllers' incentives to prevent crime. They identified ten types across formal, diffuse and personal categories, with regulators among the formal types, and argued that super controllers act on controllers through the same mechanisms that situational crime prevention uses on offenders, by altering effort, risk, rewards, excuses and provocation (Sampson, Eck and Dunham, 2010).
Read in this light, the draft codes are an attempt by Ofcom to act as a super controller of platform place managers. Fines of up to £18 million or 10 per cent of global revenue, whichever is greater, raise the risk of non-compliance (Ofcom, 2026a). A named senior individual accountable for the fraudulent advertising duties, written statements of senior managers' responsibilities and an annual review of compliance by the most senior governance body remove excuses (Wiggin, 2026). Perhaps most significantly, the proposed public advertising library, retaining adverts for a year after they stop running and searchable by keyword and advertising account through an API (PPC Land, 2026), would allow diffuse super controllers such as journalists, researchers and civil society to observe how well platforms manage their places. In Sampson and colleagues' terms, transparency multiplies the number of super controllers.
Where the code may fall short
There are three limitations that criminologists should raise as Ofcom finalises the codes.
The first is scope. The codes apply only to paid-for advertising, not to user-generated content or non-sponsored search results (Ofcom, 2026b). Ofcom notes that existing illegal content duties already apply to fraudulent content that is not part of a paid advert (Ofcom, 2026a). However, the Reuters documents suggest that the organic problem is larger still, with Meta's user base exposed to an estimated 22 billion organic scam attempts every day in addition to scam adverts (Reuters, 2025a). Where one element of an operation is cheap to replace, pressure on it tends to produce displacement. If advertising becomes harder, we should expect some fraudsters to move to organic posts, direct messages and groups, and to smaller services that fall below the thresholds for categorisation.
The second is the risk of governance without outcomes. Many of the proposed measures are policies, assessments, reviews and named accountabilities. These are necessary, but controls can exist on paper while failing in practice. A platform could hold a well-documented fraud indicator assessment and an annual board review while scam adverts continue to run. The measures of success should therefore be outcomes, such as the prevalence of scam adverts, time to removal, the rate at which banned advertisers return and the losses linked to adverts on each service, rather than the existence of the policies themselves.
The third is time. Ofcom intends to publish its final statement by mid-2027 at the latest (Ofcom, 2026b), and the codes then require parliamentary approval before they take effect (Ofcom, 2026a). Oliver Griffiths, Ofcom's Online Safety Group Director, said that "Platforms should not drag their heels – they can start making improvements for their users now" (Ofcom, 2026a). Place management theory would suggest that, without the incentive of an enforceable duty, many will wait.
Connecting the place to the payment
The most useful development may come from a different regulator. The Payment Systems Regulator intends to publish data on the platforms and services fraudsters use alongside its December consultation. If those data can be linked to Ofcom's work, the UK would for the first time be able to connect the losses reimbursed at the payment stage to the places where scams began. That would allow both regulators to judge whether platform place management is improving, using losses rather than policies as the measure.
Routine activity theory has always been optimistic in one respect. It suggests that crime can be prevented without changing offenders, by changing the settings in which they operate. The platforms are those settings. The question for Ofcom is whether its codes will change what platforms do as place managers, or only what they write down.
References
Cohen, L. E. and Felson, M. (1979) 'Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach', American Sociological Review, 44(4), pp. 588–608. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/2094589
Eck, J. E. and Madensen, T. D. (2018) 'Place management', in Bruinsma, G. J. N. and Johnson, S. D. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Criminology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190279707.013.22
Madensen, T. D. (2016) 'Opportunities for white-collar crime', in Van Slyke, S. R., Benson, M. L. and Cullen, F. T. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of White-Collar Crime. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199925513.013.19
Ofcom (2026a) 'Big Tech must tackle scourge of scam adverts, says Ofcom', 10 July. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/online-fraud/big-tech-must-tackle-scourge-of-scam-adverts-says-ofcom
Ofcom (2026b) Consultation: Fraudulent Advertising Codes of Practice. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/online-safety/online-fraud/consultation-fraudulent-advertising-code-of-practice
PPC Land (2026) 'Ofcom proposes scam-ad code as UK loses £200m a year to fraud ads', 20 July. Available at: https://ppc.land/ofcom-proposes-scam-ad-code-as-uk-loses-200m-a-year-to-fraud-ads/
Reuters (2025a) 'Meta is earning a fortune on a deluge of fraudulent ads, documents show', 6 November. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-is-earning-fortune-deluge-fraudulent-ads-documents-show-2025-11-06/
Reuters (2025b) 'Meta created "playbook" to fend off pressure to crack down on scammers, documents show', 31 December. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-created-playbook-fend-off-pressure-crack-down-scammers-documents-show-2025-12-31/
Sampson, R., Eck, J. E. and Dunham, J. (2010) 'Super controllers and crime prevention: A routine activity explanation of crime prevention success and failure', Security Journal, 23(1), pp. 37–51. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2009.17
Wiggin (2026) 'Fraudulent advertising: Ofcom consults on new rules under Online Safety Act'. Available at: https://www.wiggin.co.uk/insight/fraudulent-advertising-ofcom-consults-on-new-rules-under-online-safety-act/
Published by The Financial Crime Lab on 9 Nov 2026.
Cite as: The Financial Crime Lab (2026). The Platform Is the Place: Ofcom's Scam Advert Code and the Problem of Place Management.
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